Hormuz, Tehran puts reopening conditions in writing; Washington denies negotiations

This is not the matter of the Anglo-Ukrainian missiles opened this morning in this section: it is a second front, and in recent hours it has moved along a track different from the military one.

The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, has disclosed that Tehran is putting in writing the list of conditions under which the Strait of Hormuz can become passable again. The document, he explained, stems from a request that came from mediators. Alongside the list is an agreement already reached with Oman on a maritime corridor through the Strait, which nonetheless remains suspended: it opens only if Iran’s demands are met (Just Security, citing Reuters; Havana Times, from Democracy Now!‘s newscast).

The content of the demands was indicated by a spokesman for the Revolutionary Guards: an end to the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, compensation, removal of sanctions. These are three items of a different nature. The first is a military measure reversible within a few hours; the second involves negotiation over figures and responsibilities; the third calls into question a regulatory framework that does not depend on a single presidential decision. Placing them on the same list effectively raises the price of reopening beyond what a technical agreement on shipping traffic could resolve.

On the other side there is, at the moment, no table. President Donald Trump has stated that the United States is not talking with Iran and that the chosen course is economic punishment. White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt placed the end of the economic campaign only after the opening of substantive negotiations by Iran. The two positions mirror each other: each of the two capitals points to its own starting point as what the other considers a possible ending point.

Oman’s role is the most concrete operational element to emerge at this stage. Muscat does not appear as a party involved but as the manager of a passage: a corridor already defined, ready on paper, whose activation depends on a political decision made elsewhere. This is the classic pattern of Gulf mediation, where the technical instrument is set up in advance so that it is available the moment the political negotiation unlocks. That the negotiating infrastructure exists while the negotiation itself is publicly denied is the main feature of the day.

Several elements remain outside what can be verified. It is not known who the mediators are who requested the list, nor whether the text has already been delivered or is only being prepared. The timeframe indicated for a response is unknown, as is the extent of the corridor agreed with Oman in terms of routes and categories of vessels permitted. The information available comes from statements by Iranian and U.S. officials reported by two independent sources; neither reports direct contacts currently underway between the two administrations.

At present, then, the Strait remains closed, the Omani corridor remains conditional, and the sanctions campaign continues with no announced deadlines.