Electoral law in the Senate: three majority amendments against almost seven hundred

The deadline for submitting amendments to the electoral reform in the Senate’s Constitutional Affairs committee expired on September 1st. The count, reported by the Tg politico parlamentare of the DIRE agency, captures two opposing strategies: the majority filed three joint amendments, the opposition groups almost seven hundred texts, eight of which joint.

Among the majority’s three is the one on preferences with blocked list leaders. It is the only content that available sources indicate explicitly: the subject matter of the other two is not known.

The ratio between the numbers

Three against seven hundred is not merely a quantitative gap, it is a difference in function. A few joint amendments serve to modify the text at points chosen in advance and agreed upon within the coalition; a high number of amendments serves, in a parliamentary chamber, both to propose changes and to occupy examination time. That the opposition filed eight in joint form and all the others separately indicates a front that converges on a narrow core of points and diverges on the rest.

The interesting figure is the asymmetry between the two segments: eight common texts out of almost seven hundred means that over 98% of opposition amendments bear the signature of a single group.

The timetable

According to the calendar of parliamentary work for September, the text reaches the chamber on September 9th and the final vote is expected by the 15th. That is six calendar days, holidays included, to complete the chamber passage of a reform of the rules by which the Houses are elected.

From this arises the hypothesis, which sources indicate as not ruled out, of resorting to a confidence vote. A confidence vote compresses the discussion of amendments and turns the vote on the text into a vote on the government: it is an instrument provided for by the rules of procedure, and its use on an electoral law is a political choice to be judged by its effects on the process, not by its formal legitimacy.

The next step

The contest does not end at Palazzo Madama. In the Chamber of Deputies a secret ballot is possible and, again according to the sources cited, in the first reading the secret ballot had already put the majority in the minority. This is the point at which the arithmetic calculation of the groups stops being reliable: in a secret vote group discipline cannot be verified, and on a matter that redesigns the relationship among candidates, lists and parties, individual lawmakers’ interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the party leaderships.

In the Chamber of Deputies a secret ballot is possible: in the first reading it had already put the majority in the minority.

The issue of preferences with blocked list leaders is exactly of this kind. It concerns how an elected official arrives in Parliament and how much weight, in that process, is carried by the decision of those who compile the lists. It is a matter that divides within the groups even before dividing majority from opposition, and it is the reason why a secret vote, when admissible, changes a text’s prognosis.

What we do not know

We do not know the content of the majority’s other two joint amendments. We do not know how many of the almost seven hundred opposition amendments will be declared admissible in committee, nor how many will actually reach a chamber vote. We do not know whether the confidence vote will be called: sources indicate it as a possibility, not as a decision already taken. Finally, no date is given for the subsequent passage to the Chamber of Deputies.

The first verifiable appointment is September 9th, when the text leaves the committee and reaches the Senate chamber; the second is the 15th, the deadline by which the final vote of that branch of Parliament is expected.